Hindsight on the Unified Maoists' "Indefinite" General Strike

- Govinda Neupane

1. Kathmandu was over flooded with red flags on May Day. The procession was one of the largest processions that Nepal ever had seen. The busses, trucks, vans, etc ferried people from neighboring districts. The number of people coming from outside valley was estimated around 150,000. The lowest estimate of the number of participants in the mass meeting, as usual, was that of the Valley Police and the highest was that of the organizers, the Unified Maoists. The police estimated their number around 200,000 and the Unified Maoists said their number was more than 600,000. Anyway, their number was quite large. The crowd was jubilant. They were adding energy by singing and dancing. Among the participants, the Young Communist League (YCL) volunteers were the most visible lot. The participants included a large number of women and teenagers. In brief, the participants of the procession were joyous, enthusiastic and energetic and the procession was colorful and exciting. The same scenes were replicated in several urban centers all over Nepal. The Unified Maoist leaders made politico-sentimental speeches that enhanced jubilation, inserted heroism and replanted 'do or die' attitude. In the same venue, they declared nationwide indefinite general strike from 2nd May. The key demands included overthrowing the incumbent coalition government and establishing a new national consensus government so as to ensure stable peace and constitution writing. The party quite frankly said, "You must come to Kathmandu with shroud cloth wrapped around your heads and flour in your bags. It will be our last battle. If we succeed, we survive; else it will be the end of our party." (Unified Maoist General Secretary Badal in www.southasiarev.wordpress.com.) Thus, a "third people's movement" was unfolded.

2. The "third people's movement" was not spontaneous, it was planned meticulously. The Unified Maoist leaders were busy preparing the foundation publicly by communicating massages about "people's revolt", "overthrowing puppet government", "salvaging the peace process", "ensuring pro-people constitution writing" and "formation of the national consensus government under the Unified Maoist leadership", etc. Internally, the party and its sister organizations assessed their strengths and prepared plans to enroll their cadres and sympathizers to take them to urban centers. Similarly, to adopt Gandhian protest technology, which centers on nonviolence, they motivated the prospective volunteers and participants in 'peaceful' protest techniques and behaviors. Prior to the agitation, they also provided refresher trainings on martial arts and armed self-defense techniques to volunteers. The open demonstrations of such exercises in several parts of the cities and towns indirectly created fear among the neutral city dwellers. This made them subdued in expressing their opposition during the initial days of protest. Probably, the open demonstrations were organized keeping this as one of the objectives. The timing of the protest was quite appropriately chosen as it was dry season, the Constituent Assembly was in a stage of coma, the government was highly unpopular, frustration was at its climax among the people, the Nepali Congress was nearly headless, the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) was at the verge of division due to bitter internal quarrels and the United Nations Mission in Nepal(UNMIN) and the Nepal office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) were overtly favoring the Unified Maoists. Hence, the timing was excellent. The occasion of the May Day to declare the protest movement and implementation of the same, from the very next day was quite appropriate.

3. The Unified Maoist leaders are skilled in unfurling surprises. They have a large store of several types of surprises, and this time it was their love to nonviolence. They proudly declared the borderline of ethics for the protesters and that was no act of violence. During the initial three days, the protestors adhered to this behavioral arrangement, though it was new to the Maoist cadres and sympathizers. The leaders were busy selling this surprise. They were repeatedly mentioning that their protest remained peaceful - no tire burning, no stone throwing, no fight etc. They did not break any iron bars erected for partitioning footpath and road, nor did they smash the window glasses of the government and private buildings except a few. They did burn or destroy a few two-wheelers and four-wheelers. They also did not vandalize that many shops. The agitation of this size could have devastating effects, if judged by previous events and experiences. Interestingly, the participants were singing and dancing as if the protest was a festival and they were happily celebrating it.


4. The people from the rural areas were taken to unfamiliar places. They had to stay in strange arrangements, something like staying in a barrack system. They had to survive in an unhygienic street/city environment. Moreover, they did not see anything that is directly relevant to their lives. The strike was neither a general popular movement nor any extraordinary initiative that could be called revolt. Hence, bewilderment among the participants was quite normal. They did not get meaningful support from the local people. Most probably, the Unified Maoist leadership overestimated their strength in the urban areas particularly in the Kathmandu valley. Contrary to their expectation, the neutral local people, by and large, see the protest movement as another invasion after what Prithvinarayan Shah did two hundred forty two years ago. Already, the donation drive had antagonized many middle class people. Many among the neutral people in Kathmandu were suspicious in the beginning, started to feel fear after two-three days and perceived as some sort of threat to their very survival after fourth day. The same happened to others cities. When the forced closure prolonged, it affected the working class people. They became the primary victims. In this opportune moment, the Hindu ultras attacked and vandalized agitators' base in Birgunj. Also, local people clashed against them in Satungal in Kathmandu and other places including Budhanilakantha, Kapan, Jorpati, Patan, etc. There were serious confrontations in Dhankuta, Parbat, Pokhara, Rajbiraj and other places. The militant YCL cadres saw several acts of disobedience from many sections including from their own supporters. The situation got worse after the beating of construction wage workers in Pokhara and beating of a woman at Ratnapark in suspicion of adding pesticide in drinking water. These beatings revealed intolerance on the part of YCL. Intolerance gave opportunity to their opponents to demonize them and it clicked to some extent. The neutral mass started to polarize against them, particularly after the YCL cadres confronted against the prospective participants of the Basantapur mass meeting and their peace rally. Moreover, the Unified Maoist leadership underestimated the ability of the government to resist. It sounded that the leadership had an agitation wish, "We will put a few hundred thousands people on the street. The people will sing and dance. Under the pressure of singing and dancing, the puppet government will run to Delhi vacating the seat of power in Kathmandu. Chairman Prachanda or some other comrade will jump to the prime ministerial chair. The movement will succeed and the people will go home back thrilled with joy".

Moreover, during the initial days of the strike, there was absence of consistent position in regard to talks and protest. This inconsistency created lots of confusion. Similarly, the leadership did not foresee the possibility of infiltration by vigilantes and could not stop them from infiltration. Baring a few beatings, the vigilantes succeeded in carrying out their tasks. Also, the leadership failed to mobilize support of independent progressive individuals and groups.

Finally the leadership woke up and called the strike off. As the direct result of this tactical defeat, the political brand value of the Unified Maoist decreased, substantially. They are seen now not as a roaring lion that had been in its natural habitat, but as one domesticated. Their writ may not run as in the past as their strength got exposed. The Unified Maoist leadership has been seen visibly tired. The cadres, particularly the youth are angry. The party lost a large sympathizer base, particularly in urban centers. The talk of the town is that the Unified Maoist is not invincible. This perception has challenged the psyche of the previously unchallengeable Unified Maoist youth cadres. Now, there is a danger that the Maoist youth cadres will go back to their home bases in the rural areas and may act against local Congress and UML cadres. It should not be surprising if several Congress and UML cadres will run out of their villages or they will retaliate. Hence, the after-effects may give rise to more acts of violent confrontation.

5. Even after its tactical defeat, the Unified Maoist is still the largest cadre based party that could mobilize largest number of masses. They are down but not out. They have tested bitter pills. May be, that would cure some of their illnesses - over nurturing of personal ambitions, tall talking, fantasies and romanticism. Who knows, they may fight back as a wounded lion. In any case, this tactical defeat may not take them to oblivion. But, this defeat may crystallize the differences inside the Unified Maoists. There are already two platforms. The socialist platform could overtly UMLise itself and the Maoist revolutionary platform could reemerge as a vanguard, once again. Alternatively, the socialists' and Maoists' cohabitation within the Unified Maoist party will continue but with intensified two-line struggle in ideological and political fronts.

May 10, 2010